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opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new 
forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous 
emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. 
Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort 
discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which 
stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot 
screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening 
renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially 
fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare 
gains for both employers and employees. 
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1 Introduction 
“Trust is good, control is better.” This famous quote attributed to Lenin refers to a fundamental 
question in any principal-agent relationship: To what extend should the principal leave discretion 
to the agent? Standard principal-agent theory suggests that discretion should be limited as much 
as possible; otherwise the agent will either exploit his freedom to shirk or he will have to be 
offered expensive monetary incentives to choose actions that are in the principal's interest.1 
Similarly, Taylorism, the dominant paradigm of scientific workplace organization in the first 
two-thirds of the 20th century, is based on the assumption that workers will always work at the 
slowest rate that goes unpunished. Standardization of the production process is therefore 
essential, so that that the workers’ efforts can be effectively monitored and controlled.  
More recent human resource management theories, however, stress the cost of control. A 
worker who has to follow strict and tightly controlled rules cannot use his private information 
and ingenuity to solve problems “on the floor”, and his productivity decreases because he cannot 
adapt his actions to changes in his environment. Modern “high-performance work systems” 
decentralize the gathering and processing of information and grant authority to employees to act 
on this information as they see fit in order to solve the problems that arise.2 This strategy reduces 
the cost of control, but it makes the company vulnerable. It remains at the employee's discretion 
whether to use his authority to benefit his company or to shirk. 
In this paper, we address the fundamental trade-off between efficiency of effort and 
control of effort that underlies the different forms of work organization. We show experimentally 
that offering discretion to an agent is not profitable on its own. However, if offering discretion 
improves the agent’s flexibility and productivity in addition to being combined with high fixed 
wages that offer a rent to the agent, and if the principal can screen agents based on their past 
behavior, this combined strategy then becomes profitable. It induces the agents to work much 
harder than if their discretion is restricted and they are paid low wages and low rents. Put 
differently, we show that offering discretion, paying high wages, and screening are complements. 
                                                 
1 If the agent has fewer actions to choose from, there are fewer incentive compatibility constraints that have to be 
satisfied. Thus, the implementation of an action becomes cheaper if the agent has less discretion. Furthermore, 
Grossman and Hart (1983) show that having a more informative signal about the agent’s action reduces the 
implementation cost. Thus, having additional information through more monitoring and control, i.e. less discretion, 
is always beneficial.  
2 See, e.g., Osterman (1994a), Lawler, Mohrman and Ledford (1995), Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg 
(2000), and Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for an overview of the different forms that these work systems can take. 
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Complementarities imply that different components of a strategy reinforce each other and 
therefore lead to a bundling or clustering of these components.  
We document experimentally the endogenous emergence of two distinct clusters of job 
characteristics based on two fundamentally distinct strategies – a control strategy and a trust 
strategy. Under the control strategy, the experimental employers offered jobs characterized by 
limited effort discretion, low wages, a low requested effort, and a low rent. Under the trust 
strategy, the employers offered jobs with high effort discretion and high wages, they requested a 
high effort, and the overall compensation package involved substantial rents.3 In other words, the 
trust strategy is to offer “good” jobs, while the control strategy is associated with “bad” jobs.4 
While the trust strategy is clearly beneficial for employees, it requires a considerable amount of 
trust on the part of the employer: He pays a higher wage and – due to the greater effort discretion 
– he risks increased employee shirking. Thus, if the agent is not trustworthy, the employer incurs 
a significant loss, which raises the question how the trust strategy can be viable at all.  
Our experimental treatments identify key economic conditions under which the trust 
strategy is superior to the control strategy. We show, in particular, that opportunities to screen 
employees based on signals about past performance are decisive for the viability of the trust 
strategy. In the absence of such screening opportunities – in our base treatment – the large 
majority of employees shirked and the employers predominantly implemented the control 
strategy. In contrast, the screening treatment provided an imperfect signal about employees’ past 
performance, and many employers in this treatment conditioned their job offers on this signal. 
Employees with a signal indicating high past performance obtained good jobs in the majority of 
cases, while almost all employees with low signals received bad job offers. The employers’ 
screening behavior generated incentives for the employees to increase effort in order to improve 
their reputations, which led to a substantial increase in employees’ average effort in the 
screening treatment compared to the base treatment.  
It is important, however, to point out that the reputation formation opportunities in the 
screening treatment did not induce employees to provide high effort per se. Employees with a 
                                                 
3 This finding accords to McGregor’s (1960) theories “X” and “Y”, describing two very different attitudes toward 
workforce motivation. He claimed that employers follow either one or the other approach. 
4 The two distinct types of jobs can legitimately be termed “good” and “bad” jobs because the high wage offered 
under the trust strategy contained a large rent component, i.e. the higher wage overcompensated the employees for 
their higher effort, implying that their total compensation exceeded their supply price. Under the control strategy, the 
experimental employers typically paid just enough to induce acceptance of the job offer.  
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high performance signal tended to reciprocate reliably high wages with a high level of effort, but 
they withdrew their effort if they received a low wage offer, even if this hurt their reputation and 
lowered their expected future payoffs. This behavior forced principals to pay high wages if they 
wanted to elicit high effort. However, by offering high wages only to high-reputation employees, 
employers could limit the risk associated with paying the high wage upfront. Thus, the screening 
possibility rendered high wages and job rents profitable.  
Although the possibility of screening employees leads to an increase in the provision of 
good jobs and higher effort, it does not suffice for bringing the market to the efficiency frontier, 
as a significant fraction of employers only used the control strategy. These employers never 
learned that paying high wages to high reputation agents pays off because all employees respond 
to a low wage with low effort. Thus, these employers experienced that employees with a high 
reputation provided low effort, which reinforced their use of the control strategy. There is also a 
non-negligible minority of employees who always shirked even though investing in a good 
reputation would have been profitable. Similar to employers who never trust, these employees 
never learned that reciprocating to high wage offers by choosing high effort levels increases 
future income.  
This interaction of heterogeneous employees and employers gives rise to a segmentation 
of the labor market. In the screening treatment, some employees work hard, acquire a good 
reputation, and tend to be offered good jobs. Other employees shirk, are left with a poor 
reputation, and get stuck with bad jobs. Our results show that in an environment where screening 
and reputation building is possible, employees who only consider their narrow, short-term self-
interest are more likely to end up in work environments that are tightly controlled and leave no 
rents on the table, while employees who behave reciprocally (for intrinsic or strategic reasons) 
are more likely to get good jobs that leave them more discretion and offer higher rents.5 
What determines the relative size of these two segments in the labor market? We 
implemented competition among employers and employees in a third treatment. We show that 
competition among employers for high-reputation employees and among employees for generous 
                                                 
5 The simultaneous existence of poorly paid jobs with limited effort discretion for the employees and well paid jobs 
with a high rent and a high discretion in effort choices is reminiscent of the literature on segmented labor markets 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971, Edwards, Reich and Gordon 1975). This literature documented the existence of low and 
high pay segments of the labor market with little mobility between the segments. We find a similar segmentation 
pattern in our experimental labor market because the low reputation employees are trapped in the poorly paid 
segment of the market. 
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job offers increases the incentives for agents to acquire a high reputation and for principals to 
condition job offers on past performance, and it fosters learning such that most market 
participants behave (close to) optimally. Employers realize that they will not be able to hire 
employees with good track records by offering bad jobs. Employees realize that they will be left 
behind if they do not have a good reputation. As a result, the fraction of good jobs increases 
significantly while the fraction of bad jobs diminishes, and both employers and employees profit 
from the introduction of competition. 
A key result of our experiment is the bundling of job characteristics into good and bad 
jobs. This result suggests that one should observe a positive correlation between wages and effort 
discretion in naturally occurring field data if the forces present in the experiment generalize to 
the field. Likewise, there should be a positive correlation between job satisfaction and effort 
discretion in field data because higher effort discretion is predicted to be associated with higher 
job rents. We examine these questions using representative data for Germany (the Socio-
Economic Panel; SOEP). Both correlations are supported at high significance levels, even if we 
control for a host of factors such as education, tenure, gender, occupation, and industry, 
suggesting that our experimental results may also capture relevant forces in the field. These 
findings lend support to the generalizability of our experimental results to the field.6 
Our paper is related to the theoretical and empirical literature on reputation formation 
(e.g., Fama 1980, Kreps et al. 1982, Malcomson and MacLeod 1998, Holmström 1999, MacLeod 
2007, Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels 2004, Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004, Cabral and Hortacsu 
2006, Huck, Lünser and Tyran 2006, Brown and Zehnder 2007).7 The empirical literature has 
documented the efficiency enhancing effect of reputational incentives in a variety of contexts 
such as labor, credit, and goods markets. However, none of these papers investigated the role of 
screening and competition based on past performance signals for the employer’s decision to give 
effort discretion to employees. In other words, these papers did not examine the optimal solution 
to the fundamental trade-off between efficiency of effort and control of effort that underlies 
different forms of work organization such as Taylorist or high-performance work systems.  
                                                 
6 In a related paper, Green (2008) shows that British workers that are classified as loyal by their company enjoy 
higher effort discretion, a result that is also consistent with the notion that employers screen their employees 
according to their loyalty (reputation) and offer the loyal employees better jobs. 
7 Our data support, for example, the prediction of Holmström’s model (1999) that employees work hard in 
equilibrium if the market infers their productivity from past performance. Although our set-up differs in various 
ways from his model, our data corroborate the model's key prediction that reputational incentives enhance effort 
provision even in one-shot interactions. 
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Our paper is also related to the literature on complementarities in the organization of the 
workplace. Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy (1994), and Holmström and Milgrom (1994) have shown theoretically that important 
complementarities between technology, strategy, and incentive systems may exist. Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi (1997), MacLeod and Parent (1999), and the work summarized in 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) provide empirical evidence that complementarities between job 
characteristics, different human resource management practices, and the form of compensation 
exist.8 These empirical studies, however, did not explicitly identify the causal factors behind the 
actual implementation and the viability of a set of complementary job characteristics. In fact, one 
of the enduring puzzles in this literature is why only some firms implement innovative 
workplaces with higher effort discretion, as this enhanced productivity in the cases that were 
studied (see MacDuffie 1995, Ichniowski et al. 1997, Appelbaum et al. 2000, Ichniowski and 
Shaw 2003). Our experiments provide additional useful insights because the data enable us to 
identify screening opportunities, reputation formation, and competition as key causal forces 
behind optimal job design. 
Our findings also have a bearing on the discussion about the sources of segmented labor 
markets where good and bad jobs coexist with little mobility of workers across job types 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971, Edwards, Reich and Gordon 1975, Cain 1976). The experimental 
results suggest that workers and firms behave sub-optimally without sufficient labor market 
competition, which may be a reason for segmentation. However, if competition is strong enough, 
suboptimal behavior is largely removed and the segmentation tends to vanish. This finding 
indicates that the extent of individual rationality may not just be a personal trait, but may also be 
affected by the degree of competition in a market.  
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the impact of control and extrinsic 
incentives on intrinsic motivation and voluntary cooperation (for example, Frey 1997, Gneezy 
and Rustichini 2000, Frey and Jegen 2001, Fehr and Rockenbach 2003, Benabou and Tirole 
2006, Falk and Kosfeld 2006, Sliwka 2007, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008). In particular, Falk 
and Kosfeld (2006) show experimentally that fair-minded agents may reduce voluntary effort 
                                                 
8 For example, MacLeod and Parent (1999) show that jobs with high-powered explicit incentives in the form of 
piece rate or commission rate contracts tend to be associated with more workplace autonomy. They show, however, 
that contracts with these explicit incentives are rare and that the vast majority of workers are compensated with 
hourly wages and salaries. 
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provision if the principal chooses to control them. These “hidden costs of control” may, 
therefore, diminish the principals’ incentive to control the agents even in the absence of 
screening opportunities. Although our data are consistent with the existence of hidden costs of 
control, they also suggest that these costs are not sufficiently high (in our setting) to induce the 
employers to forgo their control option: in the absence of screening opportunities, the vast 
majority of the employers converge towards the control strategy because it is more profitable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental 
design and procedural details. In Section 3, we discuss the behavioral implications for our set-up 
if (i) all subjects are self-interested, (ii) a non-negligible share of the subjects also has a 
preference for fairness and (iii) if hidden costs of control exist. Section 4 presents and discusses 
the experimental results on the bundling of job attributes, the employers’ actual and optimal 
strategies, the existence of suboptimal employers and employees in the screening treatment, and 
the resulting segmentation of the labor market. In this section we also analyze the effects of 
competition. In Section 5 we compare our experimental results to field data. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Consider an employer who hires an employee for production. The employee generates a 
monetary gross profit eb ⋅  if he expends effort e . The parameter 1b >  reflects the employee’s 
efficiency. Gross profits accrue directly to the employer, while the employee incurs private effort 
costs eec =)( , measured in monetary terms. Thus, the employer wants the employee to choose 
high effort levels, but the employee prefers low effort. 
The employer can offer an employment contract to the employee that specifies a fixed 
wage w  and a requested, non-binding, effort level e~ . The wage must at least cover the costs of 
the requested effort. The contract can neither be conditional on effort, effort costs, nor gross 
profits. These variables are observable by both parties, but they cannot be verified by the courts. 
If the employee rejects the contract offer, no wage is paid, no effort is exerted, and both parties 
receive their reservation utilities of 0. If the employee accepts, the employer must pay the offered 
wage, irrespective of the actual effort the employee chooses. Payoffs are given by b e wΠ = ⋅ −  
for the employer and U w e= −  for the employee. 
There are two types of contracts that the employer can offer: a contract with full 
discretion and a contract with limited discretion. These contract types differ in two dimensions: 
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1. Minimum effort level: In a contract with full discretion, the employee can choose 
any effort level between 1 and 10, whereas he must choose an effort level of at least 
3 in a contract with limited discretion, given he accepts the contract. 
2. Efficiency: The effort efficiency of the relationship is characterized by 5=b  in a 
contract with full discretion, while the efficiency parameter is only 4=b  in a 
contract with limited discretion. 
This experimental design captures the fundamental trade-off between efficiency of effort 
and control of effort described in the human resource management literature.9 Limiting 
discretion forces employees to obey some minimum standards, which is reflected in the higher 
minimum effort level. But limiting discretion also restricts employees’ ability “to work more 
smartly,” that is, to react in a flexible and efficient way to a changing environment. For example, 
the employer can establish strict production procedures to tightly govern the employee’s actions, 
regulate working hours by using time cards to monitor attendance, or impose reporting 
obligations to better assess performance. However, regulated working hours force the employee 
to work when he might not be most productive, reporting obligations absorb the employee’s time 
and attention, and strict production procedures forfeit other, possibly more efficient practices. 
The harder the employee works, the more costly restricting his actions becomes. This is reflected 
by the reduction of the efficiency parameter b. Table 1 summarizes the differences between 
contracts with full and limited discretion, and the employer’s and employee’s payoff functions. 
We started out with two treatments, the base treatment and the screening treatment. Each 
treatment lasted for 15 periods and involved 18 employers and 18 employees per session. In each 
period, an employer was randomly matched with a new employee to eliminate repeated game 
                                                 
9 The efficiency gains from higher task discretion and lower control are vividly described in Walton (1985, p. 77) 
who writes that “workers respond best – and most creatively – not when they are tightly controlled by management, 
placed in narrowly defined jobs, and treated like an unwelcome necessity, but, instead, when they are given broader 
responsibilities, encouraged to contribute, and helped to take satisfaction in their work.” In broadly defined jobs, 
employees can play, in particular, “a significant role in solving problems and improving methods” which is thought 
to “boost in-plant quality, lower warranty cost, cut waste, raise machine utilization and total capacity with the same 
plant and equipment, reduce operating and support personnel, reduce turnover and absenteeism, and speed up 
implementation of change” (Walton 1985, p. 81). Note that many of the factors mentioned by Walton involve a 
higher productivity of effort, i.e. a given effort level generates higher value for the firm if effort can be exerted in 
broadly defined jobs and if employees are free to decide how they perform their tasks. The more recent literature on 
high-performance work systems (e.g., Ichniowski et al.1997, Appelbaum et al. 2000, Osterman 2006) confirms that 
not only technology and skill but also the organization of the workplace (e.g., information sharing, allocation of 
substantial decision rights, careful recruiting, training and development of people) affects employees’ productivities. 
On the downside, high-performance work systems impede the effective control of employees; in the words of 
Osterman: “employees gain the capacity to, in a sense, hold the firm hostage” (2006, p. 190).  
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effects. In the base treatment, the employer did not receive any information about his current 
employee, while he received an imperfect signal about his current employee’s track record in the 
screening treatment: he was informed about his current employee’s effort choices in the last three 
periods.10 Note that an employer neither observed the contract types, the wage offers, nor the 
requested effort levels that his current employee faced in the last three periods. The employers 
were thus not perfectly informed about their employees; a low effort choice, for example, could 
either indicate an untrustworthy employee (who was potentially offered a high wage) or a 
reciprocal employee who was offered a low wage. Employees knew that future employers would 
be able to observe their current effort choices. Apart from the information given to the employers 
in the screening treatment, the two treatments were identical.  
The screening treatment reflects the fact that employers sometimes have the opportunity 
to receive information about an employee’s past performance before the time of hiring. For 
example, the employer may see letters of reference, he may have talked to a previous employer 
about the employee, or he may have observed the employee directly in his previous position. 
This information, however, is typically incomplete. Even if the employer receives an accurate 
signal about the employee’s previous performance, he does not observe which contract induced 
the observed behavior and how well the employee was treated. This is reflected in our 
experimental design where the employer observes the employee’s actions but not the contracts 
he was offered. Note that the baseline treatment and the screening treatment can be considered as 
treatments with two extreme versions of screening costs. Screening costs in the baseline 
treatment can be thought of as being infinite, rendering any screening unprofitable, while the 
                                                 
10 If the employee did not choose an effort level in one of the past three periods because he rejected a contract, the 
principal received this information. In periods 1-3, a principal could only be informed about the effort levels that 
were available so far. 
TABLE 1—Contracts and Payoff Functions in Each Period 
 
Contract with  
Full Discretion 
Contract with  
Limited Discretion 
feasible effort levels { }10,...,1∈e  { }10,...,3∈e  
efficiency parameter 5=b  4=b  
payoffs if contract is 
accepted 
5 e wΠ = ⋅ −  
U w e= −  
4 e wΠ = ⋅ −  
U w e= −  
payoffs if contract is rejected 0UΠ = =  0UΠ = =  
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screening costs are zero in the screening treatment because the employers do not have to pay for 
the information about past performance. The human resource management literature (e.g., 
Ichniowski and Shaw 2003) stresses that careful screening activities are an important component 
of the cluster of job attributes that constitute high-performance work systems. However, pinning 
down the causal role of this factor with field data has proven to be extremely difficult. To our 
knowledge, no study shows the causal role of screening opportunities for job attributes. The 
comparison between the baseline and the screening treatments enables us to do exactly this and 
to identify the extent to which screening is an indispensable feature of organizational practices 
associated with high effort discretion.  
We conducted three sessions of the base treatment and three sessions of the screening 
treatment with 36 participants in each session. We implemented two matching groups in each 
session, so we had six matching groups for each treatment. Upon arrival at the lab, half of the 
subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned the role of an employer, the other half the 
role of an employee. The experiment was framed as an employment relationship.11 We used no 
value laden terms like full or limited discretion, control, trust, or efficiency. We also conducted 
another two sessions of a competition treatment with 32 participants each, where we 
implemented, in addition to the screening opportunity, competition between employers for 
employees and between employees for employers with attractive job offers. The competition 
treatment is described in more detail and analyzed in Section 4. 
Sessions lasted about 2½ hours and took place at the Institute for Empirical Research in 
Economics at the University of Zurich. 12 Subjects were students from the University of Zurich 
and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. On average, subjects earned about CHF 
46 (US $ 45.20), which includes a show-up fee of CHF 15 (US $ 14.70). 
 
3 Behavioral Predictions 
A central question the experiments address is whether there are complementarities between 
different attributes of a job such as the wage level, requested effort, effort discretion, and job 
                                                 
11 We implemented both treatments in each experimental session. After the subjects had participated in the base or 
the screening treatment, we conducted the respective other treatment with the same subjects. There was no role 
reversal, i.e. subjects in the role of an employer (employee) remained in that role throughout the session. We only 
use the data from the second treatment in each session in the Appendix, where we characterize the employees’ types.  
12 All experiments were computerized with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The recruitment was done with 
the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 
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rents, whether this leads to distinct bundles of job attributes, and if so, which attributes are 
bundled together. In addition, we want to isolate the causal forces that render one or the other 
bundle profit-maximizing and compare them with the bundles the employers actually chose. 
Different behavioral approaches suggest different answers to these questions. 
 
3.1  Self-interest model  
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that all people are fully rational and only interested 
in maximizing their own material payoffs. In this case, the (second best) optimal contract is 
straightforward. In the base treatment, the employee always chooses the effort level that 
minimizes his cost, which is 1=e  in a contract with full discretion and 3=e  in a contract with 
limited discretion. Furthermore, he accepts all contract offers that yield a non-negative payoff. 
Therefore, the employer offers a wage that holds the employee down to his reservation payoff of 
0. The contract that maximizes the employer’s profit is thus a contract with limited discretion 
and a wage of 3=w . This yields profit 4 3 3 9Π = ⋅ − = . Offering a contract with full discretion 
and a wage of 1=w only yields a profit of 5 1 1 4Π = ⋅ − = . This prediction holds for both the 
base and the screening treatments. In the last period of the screening treatment, employees have 
no reputation to lose and will thus choose the minimum effort level. Employers anticipate this 
and offer a contract with limited discretion and with wage 3=w . By backward induction, this 
outcome is also the unique prediction for all previous periods.  
The self-interest model thus implies that the control strategy prevails in both the base and 
the screening treatment. Employers will always offer a low wage job with limited discretion that 
just covers the effort cost of the requested low effort level, and employees always choose the 
minimal effort level of e = 3.  
 
3.2  Social preferences  
Models of social preferences (e.g. Rabin 1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) predict that some employees are “fair” and 
reciprocate high wages with high effort levels, while other employees are mainly self-
interested.13 These models also predict that controlling an employee does not reduce his effort as 
                                                 
13 See Sobel (2005) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a survey of this literature.  
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long as he is offered a fair wage.14 If the employer cannot observe the employee’s past record, 
her optimal contract offer depends on the share of “fair” employees in the population. If we 
assume that about 60 percent of the population is selfish and 40 percent is fair, then contracts 
with limited discretion and low wages are optimal in the base treatment.15 However, wages have 
to be sufficiently high to induce employees to accept them. A contract with limited discretion 
and a wage of 7 splits the surplus (almost) equally if the employee chooses the minimum effort 
of 3. Thus wages above 7 should always be accepted. 
How does the possibility of building a reputation affect this prediction? With reputation, 
there exists an efficient equilibrium along the lines of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 
(1982).16 In this equilibrium, all employers offer employees with a high reputation generous 
contracts with full discretion in all but the last few periods, and contracts with limited discretion 
and low wages to those with a low reputation. Fair employees with a high reputation (or, in 
period 1, with no reputation yet) accept generous contracts with full discretion and work hard for 
them in all periods. They reject contracts with limited discretion and those with full discretion 
combined with low wages. Selfish employees mimic fair employees in all but the last few 
periods where they start to randomize between spending a high effort of 10 and a low effort of 1. 
Once they have lost their good reputations, selfish employees shirk forever.17 
To summarize, we expect employers in the base treatment to predominantly implement the 
control strategy, i.e. they offer contracts with limited discretion and low wages, which induces 
                                                 
14 The reason is that fairness (or kindness) is evaluated only by payoff consequences in all these models. Also in 
models of intention based reciprocity such as Rabin (1993) the fairness of certain actions is evaluated by the payoff 
actually given to the other player relative to the set of feasible payoffs that could have been given to the other player. 
Thus, if the wage is fair, controlling the employee has no impact on the perceived fairness of the situation. 
15 The assumption of 60 percent selfish and 40 percent fair types is a simplification of the distribution in Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999). This simplified distribution was used in several other papers; e.g. Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007). 
16 This game differs in several respects from KMRW (1982). First, each employee in our game interacts with each 
principal only once; if he deviates, the next employers will punish him. Second, only the current employee observes 
the contract a principal offers. The principal could thus offer a low wage hoping that the employee will work hard 
nevertheless in order to keep his good reputation. This deviation is deterred in equilibrium because fair minded 
employees will reject such a contract, and a rejection does not affect their reputation. Third, there is not a small 
probability of a “commitment type” but rather a distribution of types whose fairness concerns differ. Nevertheless, 
the construction of the equilibrium follows similar lines as KMRW (1982). 
17 This equilibrium is, of course, only one of many possible equilibria in the screening treatment. The multiplicity of 
equilibria is a typical feature of games in which reputation matters; it renders unique predictions impossible. 
However, the beliefs and behaviors associated with the equilibrium we considered seem plausible; they are based on 
the intuition that employers benefit from the screening opportunity by conditioning their job offers on the available 
performance signal which then generates reputational incentives for the employees to provide high effort levels in 
response to generous job offers. Therefore, we use this equilibrium as a heuristic tool for the generation of 
behavioral conjectures. 
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employees to choose an effort level close to 3=e . In the screening treatment, employers will 
condition their job offers on the available signals about past performance: they use the trust 
strategy for employees with a high signal, i.e. offering contracts with full discretion and high 
wages, while they use the control strategy for employees with a low signal, i.e. providing 
contracts with limited discretion and low wages. The resulting incentive for reputation formation 
will induce employees to choose higher effort levels than in the base treatment. The joint effect 
of high performance signals and the conditioning of job offers on high performance signals are 
expected to lead to a prevalence of the trust strategy in the screening treatment.  
 
3.3  Hidden costs of control  
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) and Falk and Kosfeld (2006) show experimentally that controlling 
agents may crowd out voluntary effort provision. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) called this the “hidden 
costs of control,” and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) provide a formal model that rationalizes 
this behavioral pattern. There might be two forces at work in our set-up. First, control reduces 
the shirking of the selfish employees who are forced to work harder. Second, fair-minded 
employees, who are willing to provide effort above the minimally enforceable level if they are 
offered high wages and full discretion, reduce their voluntary effort provision if they are 
controlled. Note that if there are no hidden costs of control, the average effort would have to be 
higher under limited discretion because only the first effect is operative. We can thus identify the 
existence of hidden costs of control in our experiment by comparing the average effort levels 
across discretion regimes for given wages: if – conditional on wages – the average effort under a 
limited discretion contract is not higher than the average effort under a full discretion contract, 
hidden costs of control exist. If the high hidden costs of control are sufficiently high, they may 
render contracts with full discretion more profitable than contracts with limited discretion 
because the latter inhibits high effort levels of reciprocal employees. In this case, the contracts 
with full discretion may even prevail in the base treatment where the employers have no 
information about their employees.  
 
4 Results 
In Section 4.1, we first discuss the employers’ clustering of job attributes (i.e. job design) and the 
optimality of these clusters in the different situations. We then explain the pattern of profit-
maximizing clusters of job attributes in terms of employees’ effort behavior and discuss the 
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question whether hidden costs of control affect this pattern in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 examines 
whether employers offer the optimal clusters of job characteristics in the different situations and 
how the deviations from optimality are associated with labor market segmentation. In Section 
4.4, we study the impact of competition on the employees’ effort choices, the employers’ 
strategies, market segmentation, and overall surplus.  
 
4.1  Job Design and the Optimality of Different Clusters of Job Attributes 
Our experimental design allows for a large number of combinations of contracts with full and 
limited discretion, wages and rents, and requested effort levels. However, we observe two very 
distinct clusters of job characteristics in the experiment, which we summarize as 
 
Result 1 (dichotomy of job design): The employers rely predominantly on two 
fundamentally distinct strategies in both the base and the screening treatment, i.e. 
they offer two types of jobs that differ in all dimensions. They offer either a job with 
full discretion, high wages, a high requested effort level, and a large rent for the 
employee (trust strategy), or they offer a job with limited discretion, low wages, a 
low requested effort level, and a low rent (control strategy). 
 
Support for Result 1 is provided by Figure 1, which shows average wages, average 
requested effort levels, and the average offered rent for both treatments. The average offered rent 
is defined as the employee’s income if he satisfies the requested effort the employer stipulates 
(given the stipulated wage). The figure shows the same clustering of job characteristics for both 
treatments. For example, if the employer offers a job with full discretion, average wages are 
higher than 20 in both treatments, while average wages are below 10 for job offers with limited 
discretion. Likewise, the average requested effort level is roughly e~ = 8 in case of a job with full 
discretion, while the employer only asks for approximately e~ = 5 under limited discretion. Note 
also that despite the higher requested effort levels under full discretion, the employees are 
offered a much higher rent in these jobs because the higher wage over-compensates the higher 
(requested) effort cost.18 We also depicted the standard errors in Figure 1; they indicate that the 
                                                 
18 The observed differences in job characteristics are not a phenomenon that is only perceived at the level of 
averages. Rather the whole distribution of job characteristics differs fundamentally in full and in limited discretion 
jobs. In the base treatment, e.g., about three-quarters of the wages under full discretion are above w=15 while about 
three-quarters of the wages under limited discretion are below w=10. A similar picture emerges for the requested 
effort levels in the base treatment: effort levels in about three-quarters of the full discretion jobs are at or above e~ = 
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differences in job characteristics across full discretion and limited discretion jobs are highly 
significant in all cases (two-sided t-tests, controlling for individual fixed effects and clustering on 
employers, p≤0.001 for each of the six tests implicit in Figure 1). 
Result 1 suggests that job offers with full discretion are based on a trust strategy that 
attempts to appeal to the employees’ fairness, while jobs offering limited discretion implement a 
control strategy that limits the employee’s shirking opportunities and the losses the employer can 
incur. The employers seem to appeal to the employee’s fairness and reciprocity by offering a 
relatively high rent and demanding a high effort level. As Figure 1 shows, the offered rent in jobs 
with full discretion is above 12, about three times more than that in jobs with limited discretion.  
Result 1 provides no information about the frequency with which the employers rely on 
the two different strategies, nor does it tell us which strategy is optimal. However, a main 
                                                                                                                                                             
7, while about three quarters of them obey the inequality e~ ≤ 5 in limited discretion jobs. The distributions of job 
characteristics in the screening treatment are similarly distinct across the different types of jobs. 
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FIGURE 1.—Dichotomy of Job Design. In both the base and the screening treatments, employers 
use two fundamentally different strategies in designing jobs. Either they offer contracts with full 
discretion, high wages, high requested effort, and a high rent for the employee, or they offer 
contracts with limited discretion, low wages, low requested effort, and a low rent. The standard 
errors control for individual fixed effects and clustering on individual employers. 
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purpose of our study is to identify the conditions under which one strategy or the other is optimal 
for the employer. The next result provides this information.  
 
Result 2 (optimality of different clusters of job characteristics): The control strategy is 
optimal for the employer in the base treatment even though limiting discretion 
reduces efficiency, while conditioning the strategy on the employees’ track records 
is optimal in the screening treatment. In particular, implementing the trust strategy 
is optimal if the employee has a medium or high reputation, while the control 
strategy is better if the employee has a low reputation.  
 
Figure 2 provides support for Result 2. The figure shows the employers’ average profits 
conditional on wages and the discretion level of the job and thus enables us to identify the 
optimal clusters job characteristics. The first observation is that either the trust or the control 
strategy is optimal in the respective cases, meaning there is no situation in which a third strategy 
(e.g. a job design with full discretion but low wage offers) is optimal. 
In the base treatment, the highest profit level is achieved if the employer offers a job with 
limited discretion and pays wages below w=10. For wages in this interval (w<10) the employer 
earns significantly more compared to a job that implements full discretion (two-sided t-test, 
p≤0.001). In fact, the employer incurs losses on average for job offers with full discretion. For 
jobs with limited discretion, a low wage (w<10) strategy is also significantly more profitable 
than a medium wage (10≤w<20) strategy (two-sided t-test, p≤0.001). 
We observe very different profit patterns in the screening treatment, depending on 
whether the employer faces an employee with a low reputation (average effort in accepted 
contract offers in the previous three periods, denoted by r, is below 3.5) or an employee with a 
medium (3.5≤r<6.5) or a high reputation (r≥6.5). Interestingly, the profit pattern in case of a low 
reputation employee is very similar to that in the base treatment: Job offers involving full 
discretion are associated with negative profits or profits close to zero, while low wage offers 
involving limited discretion generate the highest profits. Thus, if the employer offers a job with 
limited discretion and pays low wages, profits are significantly higher compared to a low wage 
offer with full discretion (two-sided t-test, p≤0.001). A low wage strategy is also significantly 
more profitable than a medium wage strategy (two-sided t-test, p≤0.001) for jobs with limited 
discretion. 
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However, if the employer faces an employee with a medium or a high reputation, the 
profit pattern is radically different. For jobs with full discretion, profits are on average steeply 
increasing in wage levels and the highest profits can be achieved by offering wages in the highest 
wage interval (20≤w). In fact, if the employers pay high wages, their profits are significantly 
higher if they offer a job with full rather than a job with limited discretion (two sided t-test, 
p≤0.001). Furthermore, within the class of full discretion jobs, paying high wages rather than 
those in the medium interval is significantly more profitable (two sided t-test, p≤0.001).19 
 
 
                                                 
19 Tables 2 and 3 below provide regression analyses of employers’ profits in the base and the screening treatment 
confirming the results on optimal contract choices. 
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FIGURE 2.—Optimal Job Offers and Wage-Effort Relation. In the base treatment and in the 
screening treatment with low reputation employees, employers’ profits are highest when they 
offer contracts with limited discretion and pay low wages. The wage-effort relation is relatively 
flat in these cases. In the screening treatment with medium and high reputation employees, 
employers’ profits are highest when they offer contracts with full discretion and pay high wages. 
The wage-effort relation is much steeper, rendering the payment of efficiency wages profitable in 
these cases. 
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4.2  The Employees’ Effort Choices 
Result 2 raises the question why relying on the control strategy is optimal in the base treatment 
and in the screening treatment with low reputation employees, while the trust strategy is optimal 
in the screening treatment when employees have a medium or high reputation. Since the profit 
pattern observed in Figure 2 is shaped by the employees’ effort choices, we examine the 
employees’ behavior next:  
 
Result 3a (employees’ effort responses in the base treatment): The employees respond 
to higher wages with higher average effort levels in the base treatment, but the 
slope of the wage-effort relation is too small to render a high wage policy 
profitable. In addition, employees provide considerably higher effort at low wages 
when they are offered a job with limited discretion rather than a job with full 
discretion, which renders the control strategy optimal.  
 
Support for Result 3a is provided by the corresponding graphs in Figure 2 and in the 
regressions in Table 2. The effort graph for the base treatment shows that on average, higher 
wages are reciprocated with higher effort levels both for jobs with limited and for jobs with full 
discretion. However, this efficiency wage effect is too small to render a high wage policy 
optimal. This can be inferred from the profit graph for the base treatment in Figure 2, which 
shows that average profits are declining with wages in jobs with limited discretion. The wage-
profit relation is fairly flat in jobs with full discretion, and always results in negative profits.  
Figure 2 and the regressions (1) – (3) in Table 2 show that effort is higher at low wages in 
jobs with limited discretion, but that the wage effort relation is significantly smaller. We control 
for individual fixed effects and cluster on individual employees in all three regression models. In 
all cases, the wage coefficient for a full discretion job, which is the omitted category in the 
regressions, is approximately 0.2. As the productivity of effort is b=5, this coefficient implies 
that a wage increase by 10 units raises effort by roughly 2 units which in turn increase revenue 
by 5×2=10 units, implying a flat wage-profit relation for jobs with full discretion. However, 
since the interaction between limited discretion and the wage is significantly negative in all 
regressions, the wage coefficient for jobs with limited discretion is lower and amounts to 
approximately 0.14. A wage increase by 10 units thus only increases effort by 1.4 units which – 
in combination with the lower effort productivity of b=4 – increases revenue only by 4×1.4=5.6 
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units, implying that the wage-profit relation is negative. Moreover, the dummy for limited 
discretion (“limited”) is significantly positive in all regressions, indicating that the effort is 
significantly higher at low wage levels in jobs with limited discretion than in jobs with full 
discretion. This effort advantage at low wage levels reflects the fact that an employee must at 
least provide an effort of 3 under limited discretion, which outweighs the lower efficiency of 
these jobs. The higher profit for low wage jobs with limited discretion is also indicated by the 
coefficient on “limited” in regression (4) where the employers’ profit is the dependent variable. 20 
Taken together, the data indicate that in the base treatment, a high-wage policy is neither 
profitable for jobs with limited nor for those with full discretion. In addition, the effect that 
                                                 
20 Figure 2 and Table 2 raise the question whether employers’ expected profits are maximized by offering the lowest 
possible wage or whether they should rather leave some rent to employees. A closer look at the low wage interval 
(w<10) reveals that holding employees down to their reservation utility is not optimal because such offers are 
rejected with a very high probability. In particular, wages of 3, 4, 5 and 6 are rejected in 88, 83, 39 and 30 percent of 
the cases, respectively, while offers of 7 are only rejected in 13 percent of the cases. Job offers with higher wages 
are almost never rejected. Offering wages below 7 is thus not optimal. 
TABLE 2—Determinants of Effort and Employers’ Profits in Base Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 effort effort effort profit 
wage 
0.207*** 
(0.030) 
0.203*** 
(0.026) 
0.202*** 
(0.033) 
-0.07 
(0.105) 
limited×wage -0.072** 
(0.032) 
-0.074** 
(0.030) 
-0.071** 
(0.032) 
-0.263** 
(0.127) 
limited 
2.731*** 
(0.432) 
2.748*** 
(0.439) 
2.722*** 
(0.446) 
6.535*** 
(1.766) 
requested effort — 
0.017 
(0.052) 
0.022 
(0.056) 
— 
period dummies — — yes — 
constant -0.517 
(0.482) 
-0.569 
(0.506) 
-0.879 
(0.547) 
-1.307 
(1.691) 
observations 658 658 658 810 
adj. R2 0.474 0.473 0.470 0.063 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The effort regressions cluster at 54 employees and allow for individual fixed effects. 
Only accepted contracts are considered in the effort regressions because no effort is chosen if a 
contract is rejected. All contracts are included in the profit regression; a contract may be rejected 
at low wages, which reduces the average profitability of low wage offers. “Limited” is a dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 if a contract with limited discretion is offered. 
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
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employees are forced to provide more effort under limited discretion outweighs the productivity 
disadvantage of limited discretion, thus rendering a control strategy optimal in the base 
treatment.  
The next question is how the employees’ effort pattern in the screening treatment shaped 
the optimal job offers described in Result 2, which brings us directly to  
 
Result 3b (employees’ effort responses in the screening treatment):  
(i)  In the screening treatment, the effort response of the employees with a low 
reputation is very similar to their response in the base treatment, which renders the 
control strategy optimal for these employees.  
(ii)  The wage-effort relation for employees with a medium or high reputation is 
steep enough to render the payment of high wages that elicit high effort levels 
profitable. Moreover, the higher efficiency of full discretion is particularly 
advantageous at high effort levels, inducing the employers to offer this kind of job.  
 
This result is supported by the corresponding graphs in Figure 2 and by the regressions 
displayed in Table 3. A first salient characteristic of the effort pattern of employees with a low 
reputation is that it very closely resembles that in the base treatment, i.e. employees with a low 
reputation in the screening treatment act as if there were no reputational incentives. The wage-
effort relation is positively sloped for both job offers involving full and for those involving 
limited discretion. However, this slope is insufficiently steep to render a high wage policy 
profitable for employers. As the respective profit graph in Figure 2 indicates, the effort pattern 
generates a negatively sloped wage-profit relation for jobs with limited discretion and a rather 
flat slope for jobs with full discretion. This result is also supported by the regressions in Table 3. 
As in Table 2, the effort regressions in Table 3 control for individual fixed effects and cluster on 
individuals. While regressions (1) – (2) in Table 3 display a relatively large coefficient for 
“wage”, regressions (3) – (5) show that the size of the wage coefficient decreases considerably if 
we control for the employees’ reputations and the interaction between reputation levels and 
wage. Note that the omitted category in regressions (3) – (5) is a job with full discretion offered 
to a low reputation employee, meaning that the wage coefficient in these regressions captures the 
wage-effort relation for exactly these employees. The wage coefficient is about 0.19 in these 
cases, which is very similar to that in the base treatment, implying a flat wage-profit relation. 
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TABLE 3—Determinants of Effort and Employers’ Profits in Screening Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 effort effort effort effort effort profit 
wage 
0.273*** 
(0.021) 
0.295*** 
(0.022) 
0.187*** 
(0.049) 
0.188*** 
(0.051) 
0.187*** 
(0.051) 
0.065 
(0.185) 
limited ×  wage -0.147*** 
(0.039) 
-0.157***
(0.033) 
-0.105***
(0.038) 
-0.105***
(0.039) 
-0.101** 
(0.038) 
-0.478***
(0.112) 
limited  
2.894*** 
(0.562) 
3.230*** 
(0.522) 
2.478*** 
(0.571) 
2.474*** 
(0.576) 
2.417*** 
(0.559) 
6.870*** 
(1.772) 
medium-reputation — 
-0.233 
(0.216) 
-1.560***
(0.537) 
-1.559***
(0.537) 
-1.515*** 
(0.540) 
-1.048 
(1.800) 
high-reputation — 
-0.272 
(0.323) 
-2.493***
(0.737) 
-2.488***
(0.751) 
-2.468*** 
(0.761) 
-4.725** 
(1.928) 
medium-reputation 
×  wage — — 
0.102** 
(0.043) 
0.102** 
(0.043) 
0.099** 
(0.044) 
0.424** 
(.1767) 
high-reputation  
×  wage — — 
0.143*** 
(0.050) 
0.143*** 
(0.050) 
0.142*** 
(0.051) 
0.722*** 
(.1769) 
requested effort — — — 
-0.004 
(0.058) 
-0.004 
(0.058) 
— 
other period 
dummies 
— — — — yes — 
last period 
-1.959*** 
(0.404) 
-2.025***
(0.414) 
-1.933***
(0.419) 
-1.933***
(0.418) 
-1.829*** 
(0.510) 
-7.038***
(1.839) 
constant 0.233 
(0.410) 
-0.032 
(0.490) 
1.442** 
(0.719) 
1.455* 
(0.733) 
1.369* 
(0.787) 
0.110 
(2.230) 
observations 711 655 655 655 655 745 
adj. R2 0.649 0.661 0.676 0.675 0.671 0.301 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The effort regressions cluster at 54 employees and control for individual fixed 
effects. Only accepted contracts are considered in the effort regressions because no effort is 
chosen if a contract is rejected. All contracts are included in the profit regression; a contract 
may be rejected at low wages, clearly affecting profits. In columns (2) - (6) we only consider 
observations with at least one previous effort choice because an employee’s reputation 
cannot be classified otherwise. “Limited” is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 if a 
contract with limited discretion is offered. “Medium-reputation” and “high-reputation” are 
dummy variables that take on value 1 if r is in [3.5,6.5) or [6.5,10], respectively. “Last 
period” is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 for observations in period 15.  
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
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Moreover, the profit regression (6) in Table 3 reveals that the interaction between limited 
discretion and wages is significantly negative, while the dummy for “limited discretion” is high 
and significantly positive. Thus, as in the base treatment, the employers can earn the highest 
profits if they pay low wages and offer a job with limited discretion whenever they face an 
employee with a low reputation.21 
Figure 2 further shows that employees with a medium or high reputation display a much 
steeper wage-effort relation than those with a low reputation. The steeper slope translates into a 
steep wage-profit relation, providing the highest profits for wages of w=20 or higher. The 
regressions in Table 3 statistically support this effort and profit pattern. A particularly interesting 
aspect concerns the specific role of employees with a medium or high reputation. Regression (2) 
shows that these employees do not provide a higher effort level per se – the coefficient on 
medium and high reputation is small and insignificant in this regression. Rather, these employees 
tend to supply the same low effort level as low reputation employees if offered a low wage, but 
they provide a much higher effort if offered a high wage. This fact is revealed by regressions (3) 
– (5) which show that the medium/high reputation employees display a smaller intercept 
(because the coefficient on medium and high reputation is significantly negative) and a larger 
slope in the wage-effort space than the low reputation employees (because the interaction 
between wages and medium/high reputation is significantly positive). The slope effect, in 
particular, is large and quantitatively important because it generates an incentive for the 
employers to pay high wages to these employees.22 The profit regression (6) corroborates these 
findings and indicates that the effort behavior of medium and high reputation employees causes a 
sizeable efficiency wage effect that renders the trust strategy optimal.23 
Taken together, the evidence unambiguously indicates that conditioning the job offer on 
the employees’ reputation is profit maximizing. Employers can elicit high effort in highly 
                                                 
21 Similar to the base treatment, we may ask which of the wages in the low wage interval maximizes the employers’ 
profits. Rejection rates for wages offers of 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are 100, 59, 50, 39 and 4 percent, respectively, while 
wages above 7 are basically never rejected. Hence, wage offers between 7 and 9 were most profitable for the 
employers.  
22 For an employee with a medium reputation, the slope of the wage-effort relation in a job with full discretion is 
roughly 0.19+0.10=0.29, implying that a wage increase by 10 units causes a revenue increase by 5×2.9=14.5 units. 
Likewise, the slope is 0.19+0.14=0.33 for an employee with a high reputation, implying that a wage increase of 10 
units generates a revenue increase by 5×3.3=16.5 units. 
23 The question of which wage above 20 is optimal for the employers if they face an employee with a medium or 
high reputation remains open. It turns out that the average effort of these employees lies at 6.2 units if offered w = 
20, 8.8 units at a wage of 25, and 9.0 units if they are offered a wage of 30 in a job with full discretion. On average, 
it thus does not pay to offer wages above 25 because of the ceiling effects that occurs at high effort levels. 
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productive jobs with a limited risk of shirking if they offer high wages and full discretion only to 
employees with a good reputation. In contrast, employees with a low reputation should receive 
only a low wage and be forced to provide at least an effort level of 3.  
In Section 3 we discussed the potential role of hidden costs of control in our setting. The 
previous results on the employees’ effort behavior also shed light on the extent to which hidden 
costs of control affected optimal job offers. Figure 2 and the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 show 
that (potential) hidden costs of control are not sufficiently large to render job offers with full 
discretion optimal, neither in the base treatment nor for low reputation employees in the 
screening treatment. Moreover, it is possible to show that (potential) hidden costs of control are 
not a necessary prerequisite for the optimality of job offers with full discretion for medium and 
high reputation employees.24 Hidden costs of control thus do not play a prominent role in the 
choice of the optimal employment strategy in our setting. 
Note that these findings do not imply that there are no hidden costs of control. In fact, the 
observation that average effort for high wages is not higher under contracts with limited 
discretion (see Figure 2 and the regression results in Tables 2 and 3) is consistent with the 
existence of hidden costs. If discretion is limited, agents who would otherwise choose the 
minimum effort level of one are now forced to choose the minimum effort level of three. If no 
crowding out of voluntary effort provision takes place, average effort should thus increase. 
 
4.3  Actual Job Offers, Labor Market Segmentation, and Total Surplus 
The previous results inform us about the conditions under which and the reasons why the trust 
and the control strategy are optimal, but we have not yet reported whether the employers chose 
the corresponding optimal employment strategy. The next result addresses this question. 
 
Result 4 (employers’ actual job offers):  
(a)  In the base treatment, the large majority of employers converges towards 
optimal behavior and implements the control strategy.  
                                                 
24 To see this, consider the relevant wage interval (20≤w) for high reputation employees. In this interval, the average 
effort for jobs with full discretion is about 8, yielding revenue of about 5×8=40. Now consider jobs with limited 
discretion and assume that hidden costs of control are completely absent. This implies that average effort increases 
because none of the employees reduces his effort relative to the full discretion case. Assume further, for the sake of 
the argument, that limiting discretion increases every employee’s effort by 2 (minimum effort increases from 1 to 3). 
Average effort would then be 10, yielding revenue of 4×10=40, which just matches revenue under full discretion. 
Clearly, limiting discretion would raise average effort by less than 2 (e.g. only some agents are below the threshold 
of e=3). Limited discretion jobs were thus still not more profitable than full discretion jobs, even under a complete 
absence of hidden costs. These costs, therefore, cannot the reason for the optimality of full discretion contracts. 
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(b)  In the screening treatment, employers behave optimally in the majority of cases 
and condition their strategy on the employees’ reputation, i.e. if they face low 
reputation employees, they use the control strategy in the large majority of cases, 
while they utilize the trust strategy in more than half of the cases if they face 
medium or high reputation employees. 
 
To support Result 4, we report the relative frequency of jobs with full discretion in the 
different conditions. We know from Result 1 that a job with full discretion is associated with the 
trust strategy, while a job with limited discretion is associated with the control strategy. The 
overall share of the trust strategy is about 30 percent in the base treatment, but this share declines 
to 19 percent in periods 10-14, indicating that some employers needed some time to learn the 
optimal strategy.25 A similar picture emerges in the screening treatment if the employer faces an 
employee with a low reputation. In this case, the overall share of the trust strategy is 22 percent, 
declining to 16 percent in periods 10-14. A Fisher exact test indicates that the employers choose 
on average the same strategy in the base treatment (239 out of 810 cases) and in the screening 
treatment with low reputation employees (48 out of 172 cases; p=0.791). However, employers 
implement the trust strategy much more frequently for employees with a medium or high 
reputation. The overall share of trust strategies is 55 percent and remains the same in periods 10-
14. The share of trust strategies is significantly higher for medium and high reputation 
employees (290 out of 525 cases), compared to low-reputation employees and compared to the 
base treatment; Fisher exact texts, p≤0.001.26 
Although employees with a medium or high reputation faced a trust strategy in a majority 
of cases, they also faced non-optimal job offers with limited discretion in 45 percent of the cases. 
This raises the question about the sources of this sub-optimality, a topic to which we turn next. 
 
Result 5 (suboptimal behavior and labor market segmentation):  
(a)  The frequency of optimal behavior is lower in the screening treatment than in 
the base treatment because a significant minority of employers do not condition 
their job offer on the employees’ reputation but always follow the control strategy.  
                                                 
25 We choose periods 10-14 and excluded period 15 because in the final period the incentive for reputation 
formation is completely absent, while this incentive still exists in period 14. 
26 We have three sessions with 18 employers each that offer contracts in 15 periods, so there are 810 observations in 
each treatment. Since we can only classify the employees’ reputation if there is at least one previous effort choice, 
the number of relevant observations in the screening treatment is only 525+172=697. 
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(b)  A significant share of narrowly self-interested employees does not reciprocate 
high wages with high effort in the screening treatment, implying that they are 
permanently stuck with bad jobs with limited discretion.  
 
Result 5a highlights that the incidence of optimal job offers is higher in the base 
treatment than in the screening treatment. The main reason for this difference is the existence of 
a sizable share of employers who did not condition their strategies on the employees’ reputation. 
Almost 17 percent of employers (9 out of 54) always opted for the control strategy in the 
screening treatment. Another 4 percent (2 out of 54) chose the trust strategy only once. A closer 
look at the data shows the non-responsive employers did not face a worse distribution of 
employees than the responsive employers: those who always chose the control strategy had 
employees with an average reputation index of 5.25, while the overall average of the reputation 
index was 5.24. These non-responsive employers might have had very pessimistic beliefs about 
their employees’ effort choices or they might have been highly risk or betrayal averse. Because 
they did not condition their strategy on employees’ reputation, they made significantly lower 
average profits (4.13) than employers who responded to their employees’ past behavior (7.16; 
two-sided t-test, p=0.004). 
Employers who never trust and always implement the control strategy induce employees 
who would have worked hard for a generous wage to provide low effort. Furthermore, the 
incentives for employees to acquire a good reputation are diminished since not all employers 
condition their job offers on reputation. However, acquiring a good reputation remains 
profitable: employees with a low reputation have an average income of 6.66, while employees 
with a high reputation have a significantly higher income of 12.14 (two-sided t-test, p≤0.001). 
Nevertheless, Result 5b shows that a significant fraction of the employees always chose low 
effort levels in the screening treatment – even when they were offered high wages. We show in 
the appendix that these employees also chose low effort levels in the base treatment regardless of 
the offered wage; they can therefore be classified as narrowly self-interested employees, and 
account for about 20 percent of the employees.27 We also report in the appendix that roughly 30 
percent of the subjects are reciprocal types because they respond to generous wages with high 
effort levels both in the screening treatment and the base treatment. The remaining 50 percent of 
                                                 
27 To derive the behavioral types we use the fact that all subjects participated in the base and the screening treatment.  
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the individuals can be classified as strategic types because they only reciprocate generous wages 
with high effort levels in the reputation treatment, but not in the base treatment.  
Result 5 explains why a substantial fraction of both good and bad jobs co-exist in the 
screening treatment. A sizeable group of employers only offers bad jobs regardless of the 
employees’ reputations, and an equally large group of employees does not respond to the 
prevailing incentives for reputation formation. These employees only consider their narrow, 
short-term self-interest and are thus more likely to end up in jobs that are tightly controlled and 
leave no rents on the table, while employees who behave reciprocally are more likely to get 
better jobs that leave more discretion and offer higher rents. In addition, the non-responsive 
employers dilute the incentives for reputation formation and the narrowly self-interested 
employees reduce the opportunity for employers to offer good jobs.  
The co-existence of good and bad jobs is reminiscent of the literature on dual labor 
markets (e.g., Doeringer and Piore 1971, Edwards, Reich and Gordon 1975) that provides a 
stylized description of actual labor markets in terms of a primary and a secondary market. In the 
primary market, employees enjoy higher wages and job security, while low wages, high 
turnover, and low job security prevail in the secondary sector. Bulow and Summers (1986) and 
Saint-Paul (1997) link the description of dual labor markets with efficiency wage theories based 
on differences in monitoring costs or employment adjustment costs across the two sectors. In 
these models, technological factors are the source of dual labor markets. In our experiment, 
however, all employers have the same job creation technology available. Our findings, therefore, 
suggest that sub-optimal choices by the employers and individual characteristics of the 
employees (their reciprocal, strategic, or narrowly self-interested behavior) may also contribute 
to the segmentation of the labor market.  
Despite the existence of a substantial minority of sub-optimal employers and employees, 
however, the screening treatment provides incentives for higher effort and the provision of more 
jobs with full discretion. This leads to  
 
Result 6 (screening and total surplus): The screening opportunity causes a strong 
increase in the total surplus which is primarily reaped by the employers.  
 
The impact of the screening treatment on the employers’ and employees’ average income 
can be inferred from Figure 3. The figure shows that both employers and employees benefit on 
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average from the screening opportunities. For the employers, the increase in average income is 
significant (Mann-Whitney test based on matching group averages, p=0.004), while the null 
hypothesis of equal incomes across treatments cannot be rejected for the employees (Mann-
Whitney test on matching group averages, p=0.200). Overall, the total surplus is 58 percent 
higher in the screening treatment – a difference that is highly significant (Mann-Whitney test on 
matching group averages, p=0.007). This increase in the total surplus has two sources – the 
higher share of jobs with full discretion (documented in Result 4) and the higher average effort 
of the employees. In fact, we observe a significant increase in average effort from 3.00 in the 
base treatment to 4.48 in the screening treatment (Mann-Whitney test on matching group 
averages, p=0.007).28  
This effort increase represents the joint effect of employers’ and employees’ behavior in 
the screening treatment. Because the employers condition their strategy on the performance 
signals, the employees have an incentive to provide high effort in response to high wages. And 
because a good reputation is a reliable signal for the willingness to reciprocate generous wages 
with high effort, the employers need not fear shirking if they pay high wages and offer full 
discretion jobs. Thus, the actions of the responsive employers’ and the reciprocating employees’ 
mutually reinforce each other and lead to the provision of high effort levels and a majority of 
good jobs with full discretion, both of which increase the total surplus.  
                                                 
28 In this test, we assigned an effort of zero to rejected contracts. If only accepted contracts are considered, average 
effort increases from 3.70 in the base treatment to 5.10 in the screening treatment; the difference is significant 
(Mann-Whitney test on matching group averages, p=0.004). 
 
FIGURE 3.—Employers’ profits, employees’ incomes, and surplus in the different treatments. 
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4.4  Competition 
Our screening treatment identifies the causal impact of screening opportunities in a bilateral 
bargaining environment. In most labor markets, competition and screening interact in intricate 
ways. Since they almost always exist simultaneously it is difficult to identify how competition 
shapes the employers’ screening activities and employees’ reputation formation behavior in field 
data. Our laboratory setting enables us to study this question cleanly by conducting an additional 
treatment that introduces competition among the employees for good job offers and among 
employers for good employees. The competition treatment also allows us to answer the question 
whether competition renders the control strategy or the trust strategy more efficient.  
Our competition treatment has the following features. At the beginning of each of the 15 
periods, groups with four randomly selected employers and four randomly selected employees 
are matched. Each employer observes all four employees' performance signals, and then must 
make a contract offer to each of the four employees. Because an employer can only employ one 
employee, the employers also specify the order in which the 4 employees receive their respective 
offers. There are four matching rounds in every period in order to match the employers to the 
employees. In the first round, each employer’s most preferred employee receives the offer, 
meaning that any one employee might receive several offers (up to four), just one offer, or none. 
The employees who received offers in this round then decide whether to accept any of these 
offers, but may not accept more than one. Once an employee accepts an offer, he or she is then 
matched with the corresponding employer and both players are not involved in the subsequent 
matching rounds. Employers whose offers are rejected and employees who did not receive or 
accept an offer enter the second round. In this round, the remaining employers’ second preferred 
employees receive an offer. This process continues in rounds 3 and 4.29  
As in the previous treatments, employees do not observe the offers the other employees 
receive. However, an employee may have to wait until the second, third, or even fourth round of 
offers before getting his first offer, in which case he may conclude that he is no employer's first 
choice. Similarly, as in the previous treatments, employers do not observe the contract offers 
other employers make. However, if an employer’s offers are frequently not accepted during the 
early matching rounds, he may conclude that other employers offered more attractive contracts. 
                                                 
29 We introduced competition only in the screening treatment and not in the base treatment because competition 
cannot make any difference in the latter. All employees look identical without performance signals, and employers 
cannot discriminate between them.  
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Both effects foster learning. Note that this learning opportunity captures a feature of most labor 
markets in the field because employees with a low reputation presumably also have more 
difficulties finding a job in these markets, and employers who offer less attractive jobs have to 
wait longer to fill their vacancies. 
We showed in Section 4.1 that the employers offer two very distinct bundles of job 
characteristics both in the base and in the screening treatment. Figure 4 shows the same 
dichotomy of job characteristics in the competition treatment: Contracts with full discretion are 
associated with much higher wages, higher requested effort levels, and a significantly higher job 
rent. Figure 4 also depicts standard errors; they indicate that the differences in job characteristics 
across contracts with full and limited discretion are significant in all cases (two-sided t-tests, 
controlling for individual fixed effects and clustering on employers, p ≤ 0.001 for each of the 
three tests implicit in Figure 4).30 The bundling of distinct job characteristics into good and bad 
jobs is thus a robust phenomenon that occurs under all treatment conditions.  
Figure 4, however, does not inform us about the optimality of the different types of job 
offers. It turns out that the qualitative pattern of payoffs is very similar to the screening 
treatment. Profits are declining in wages for the low-reputation employees, while profits are 
                                                 
30 As in the base and the screening treatments, the dichotomy of job characteristics is not just a phenomenon at the 
level of averages; instead, the whole distribution of job characteristics is fundamentally different across jobs with 
full and limited discretion. In full discretion jobs, e.g., 90 percent of all wages are higher than 15, while roughly half 
of all wages are equal or less than 10 in limited discretion jobs. A similar dichotomy is also present for requested 
effort levels. In full discretion jobs, 95 percent of the job offers involve a requested effort level of e~ ≥ 7, while 
almost 50 percent of all job offers are associated with a requested effort of e~ < 7 in limited discretion jobs. 
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FIGURE 4.—Dichotomy of Job Design in Competition Treatment. As in the base and screening 
treatments, employers use two fundamentally different strategies in job design. Either they offer 
contracts with full discretion, high wages, high requested effort, and a large rent, or they offer 
contracts with limited discretion, low wages, low requested effort, and a low rent. The standard 
errors control for individual fixed effects and clustering on individual employers. 
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maximized with medium and high reputation employees if they are offered high wages and jobs 
with full discretion.  
To what extent did the employers implement the optimal trust strategy in the competition 
treatment? Result 7a shows that this occurred to a much larger degree than in the screening 
treatment. 
 
Result 7 (competition substantially increases the share of good jobs):  
(a)  In the competition treatment, almost all high reputation employees receive 
good job offers and almost all low reputation employees get bad job offers.  
(b)  The large majority of employees works hard and acquires a high reputation.  
 
Result 7a is supported by the left graph of Figure 5, which illustrates the share of job 
offers with full discretion that employees with different reputations face in the screening and the 
competition treatments. The figure shows that the higher an employee’s reputation in the 
screening treatment, the more often he receives a job offer with full discretion (in 17, 38, and 52 
percent of the cases, respectively). The competition treatment strongly reinforces this pattern. 
Employees with a high reputation are now considerably more likely to receive offers with full 
discretion (in roughly 80 percent of the cases), while employees with a medium or low reputation 
receive fewer such offers than in the screening treatment (only in 27 percent and 6 percent of the 
cases, respectively). The treatment differences in shares of contract offers are significant in all 
three reputation classes (Fisher exact-tests, p=0.024 for low reputation and p≤0.001 for medium 
and high reputation). 
The stronger conditioning of job offers on employees’ reputations has important 
consequences for their incentives to form a good reputation. Because jobs with full discretion are 
associated with higher rents, the employees in the competition treatment have a stronger 
incentive to form a good reputation. This effect is indicated in the right graph of Figure 5 which 
depicts the employees’ average income from a trade as a function of their reputation. This graph 
mimics the qualitative pattern of the left graph because the increase in income from building a 
high instead of just a medium or low reputation is much larger in the competition treatment than 
in the screening treatment.  
Did the employees’ respond to these stronger incentives by acquiring higher reputation 
levels? Result 7b shows that this was indeed the case. In Figure 6 we display the distribution of 
  30
individual employees’ average reputation indices in the screening and the reputation 
treatments.31 The figure shows that the reputation indices in the competition treatment are very 
different from those in the screening treatment – a difference that is highly significant according 
to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p≤0.001). For example, more than 80 percent of the employees 
in the competition treatment have on average a reputation index exceeding r=6.5 (“high 
reputation”), while only 30 percent of the employees in the screening treatment acquire on 
average a high reputation. In addition, almost none (3 percent) of the employees in the 
competition treatment displays on average a low average reputation (i.e. r<3.5) while about a 
quarter of the employees in the screening treatment fall into this category. This finding also 
indicates that the competition treatment almost completely removes narrowly self-interested 
strategies from the employees. Therefore, when competition complements screening 
opportunities, the segmentation of the labor market greatly decreases. The overall share of jobs 
with full discretion is now 77 percent; in periods 10-14, when reputation incentives still exist and 
subjects had time to learn the mechanisms of reputation formation under competitive conditions, 
this share even reaches 82 percent. 
The increased sorting and the steeper reputational incentives have a strong impact on the 
employers’ and the employees’ average income and total surplus. This is summarized in  
                                                 
31 Recall that the reputation level is given by the effort levels in the previous three periods. Thus, they closely reflect 
the employees’ effort choices.  
          Screening by Employers      Reputation and Income 
FIGURE 5.—Employers’ sorting behavior across the reputation and competition treatment (left 
graph) and the consequences for employees’ incentives for reputation formation (right graph). 
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FIGURE 6.—Distribution of employees’ reputation indices. 
 
Result 8 (competition and total surplus): The introduction of competition in addition to 
screening opportunities causes a substantial increase in total surplus. Both sides of 
the market, employers and employees, significantly benefit from competition. 
 
Evidence for the last result comes from Figure 3. Both the employers’ average profit and 
the employees’ average income are higher in each of the four matching groups of the 
competition treatment than in all six matching groups of the screening treatment (Mann-Whitney 
tests on matching group averages yield p=0.011). Overall, the total surplus is 72 percent higher 
in the competition treatment than in screening treatment and 172 percent higher than in the base 
treatment; the differences are again significant (Mann-Whitney tests on matching group 
averages, p=0.011). The increase in total surplus is also driven by a significant increase in 
average effort which amounts to 7.27 in the competition treatment.32 The differences to the base 
(3.00) and the screening treatment (4.48) are again significant (Mann-Whitney tests on matching 
group averages, p=0.011). 
 
5 Field Evidence 
One of our main results concerns the endogenous clustering of job attributes in two distinct 
bundles of job characteristics. In particular, we observe a positive correlation between wages, job 
rents, and effort discretion. This raises the question whether we can observe qualitatively similar 
                                                 
32 If only accepted contracts are considered, average effort amounts to 8.02 in the competition treatment. 
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correlations in field data. We examined this question on the basis of data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative annual panel survey for the 
resident population of Germany that collects information on a wide range of personal and 
household characteristics, including earnings, job satisfaction, education, work experience, and 
occupation.33 The 2001 wave of the survey, which covers 22,351 individuals from 11,947 
households, also contains a set of questions on work conditions, two of which have a direct 
bearing on the level of discretion at the workplace: 1) “Can you decide yourself how to complete 
your work tasks?” 2) “Is your work performance strictly monitored?” 
Respondents who were employed at the time of the survey could answer each question by 
indicating either “applies completely” or “applies partly” or “does not apply at all.” The answers 
to these questions provide a measure of effort discretion because granting discretion on how to 
complete tasks obviously influences how employees allocate their effort, and strict performance 
monitoring reduces the shirking opportunities. 
Using these two measures, we find a positive, highly significant correlation between job 
discretion and wages. The dependent variable in the regressions in columns (1) – (3) of Table 4 
is the log of gross monthly wages (in Euro). “Some Autonomy” (“Full Autonomy”) is a dummy 
variable indicating that a respondent answered “applies partly” (“applies completely”) to the task 
discretion question; “Some Monitoring” (“No Monitoring”) is a dummy variable indicating the 
answer “applies partly” (“does not apply at all”) to the performance monitoring question. 
Respondents who stated the respective third options serve as baseline.34 Columns (1) and (2) 
show raw correlations: absent any controls both job discretion measures are highly significantly 
associated with higher earnings. For example, a job with full autonomy pays 35 percent higher 
wages than one without autonomy on task completion. Similarly, employees who are not 
monitored at all earn 12 percent more than employees whose work performance is strictly 
monitored. We account for a large number of control variables in the regression in column (3) 
because we want to analyze whether ceteris paribus wages are higher in jobs with more 
discretion. To control for worker heterogeneity and differences in occupations and industries, we 
account for occupation (390 categories), industry (62 categories), education (5 categories), labor 
                                                 
33 The initial wave of the survey was conducted in 1984. The territory of the former German Democratic Republic 
has been included in the survey since 1990. For more detailed information, see http://www.diw.de/en/soep.  
34 Our sample consists of all individuals who were employed fully or part-time at the time of the interview; 
apprentices and the self-employed were excluded. 
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market experience, tenure at current employer, gender, firm size, region, hours of work, and 
temporary or permanent employment. Controlling for these factors reduces the size of the 
coefficients of the job discretion measures, but both remain highly significant. The regression 
reveals that jobs with full discretion (full autonomy and no monitoring) are associated with more 
than 10 percent higher wages than jobs in the base line category with no discretion (no autonomy 
and full monitoring).35 
In our experimental data, jobs with full discretion are not only associated with higher 
wages but also with higher job rents, i.e. higher wages overcompensate the employees for the 
cost of higher effort requirements. Thus, these jobs yield higher utility for the employees. We 
consider job satisfaction as a proxy for the overall utility derived from the job. The SOEP 
                                                 
35 The existence of a positive correlation between wages and effort discretion has previously been documented by 
Osterman (1994b) for the US. He also used “levels of supervision” and “levels of discretion” as measures of high-
performance work systems and showed that both measures are significantly correlated with employers’ policies to 
pay above-market wages. In their meta-study of 26 papers that analyze the effect of different forms of high-
performance work systems on employees’ wages, Handel and Levine (2004) conclude that the “average effect is 
somewhere between 0 and 5 percent, although larger effects have been found in a small number of cases” (p. 35). In 
an empirical test of efficiency wage theory, Rebitzer (1995) analyzes wages of contract maintenance workers in the 
petrochemical industry and finds that high levels of supervision are associated with lower wage levels. 
TABLE 4—The Impact of Job Discretion on Wages and Job Satisfaction in the SOEP 
dependent variable: Log Gross Monthly Wage Standardized Job Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
some autonomy 0.235*** 
(0.019) 
 0.042*** 
(0.012) 
0.095*** 
(0.033) 
 0.071** 
(0.036) 
full autonomy 0.353*** 
(0.019) 
 0.057*** 
(0.012) 
0.336*** 
(0.034) 
 0.281*** 
(0.038) 
some monitoring  0.083*** 
(0.019) 
0.033*** 
(0.011) 
 0.160*** 
(0.033) 
0.142*** 
(0.034) 
no monitoring  0.125*** 
(0.019) 
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
 0.352*** 
(0.034) 
0.295*** 
(0.036) 
control variables no no yes no no yes 
observations 7770 7770 7770 7710 7710 7710 
adj. R2 0.041 0.005 0.695 0.017 0.016 0.049 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. “Some autonomy,” “full autonomy,” “some monitoring,” and “no monitoring” are 
dummy variables indicating the degree of job discretion. Experience, tenure, education, firm 
size, gender, region, actual work hours, temporary employment, job and industry categories are 
included as additional controls in regressions (3) and (6). 
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
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measures job satisfaction with the following question: “How satisfied are you with your job?” 
Respondents can answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means totally unsatisfied and 10 means 
completely satisfied. A well known theoretical results says that job rents are absent in the 
equilibrium of a competitive labor market because the wage compensates workers for all non-
pecuniary job characteristics (Rosen 1987). Thus, if performance monitoring or task discretion 
have non-pecuniary attributes (or pecuniary correlates that cannot be controlled by the 
econometrician) that affect workers’ utilities, wages will vary in such a way that job satisfaction 
(utility) is kept constant at the equilibrium utility level. This means that if the data from the 
SOEP reflect competitive labor market outcomes, task discretion and monitoring should have no 
effect on job satisfaction if one does not control for individuals wages, i.e., if wages can adjust to 
compensate for uncontrolled non-pecuniary or pecuniary characteristics. In contrast, if higher 
task discretion and less monitoring exhibit a positive correlation with job satisfaction, we can 
take this as evidence that wages do not compensate fully for the utility relevant characteristics of 
the job. Therefore, the higher job satisfaction associated with more task discretion and less 
monitoring can be taken as an indication of a job rent. 
The dependent variable in the regressions in columns (4) – (6) of Table 4 is the 
normalized job satisfaction measure. Columns (4) and (5) show raw correlations: absent any 
controls both effort discretion measures are highly significantly associated with higher job 
satisfaction. Jobs with full autonomy or without any monitoring are associated with levels of job 
satisfaction that are about a third of a standard deviation higher than the satisfaction of the 
comparison groups. In the regression in column (6), we account for same set of personal and 
labor market characteristics as in the regression in column (3) and find that both effort discretion 
measures remain highly significant. Workers who can decide themselves how to complete a task 
have a job satisfaction that is 0.28 standard deviations higher than those who have no task 
discretion, and workers who say that their performance is not at all strictly monitored have a 0.3 
standard deviation higher job satisfaction than those who are strictly monitored. Thus, the job 
satisfaction data also lend support to the generalizability of our results to the field. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Lenin is right – up to a point: Offering discretion to an agent invites shirking and is not profitable 
on its own. However, if offering discretion is combined with paying more generous wages that 
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offer a rent to the agent, if discretion improves the agent’s productivity, and if the principal can 
screen agents based on past behavior, this combined strategy can be both profitable and can 
outperform control. Our experimental results show that offering discretion, paying high wages, 
and screening are complements that reinforce each other and yield a clustering of job attributes 
into “good” and “bad” jobs. The ability to screen agents is a necessary condition for the viability 
of good jobs. However, even if employers can screen employees by past performance, not all of 
them offer good jobs. A significant minority of employers and employees do not trust each other 
(even though this would be profitable), which leads to a segmented labor market. Competition 
largely removes suboptimal behavior and causes a considerable increase in the share of good 
jobs. This results in large welfare gains for both employers and employees. 
Our results indicate the existence of two distinct clusters of job attributes in all 
treatments, that is, regardless of the existence of screening opportunities or whether competition 
prevails. The clustering of job attributes suggest that both workers’ autonomy on the job and the 
absence of monitoring are positively correlated with wages and job rents. Field data from the 
German Socio-economic panel indeed confirm these correlations. They are highly significant and 
substantial in size, even if we control for a wide range of socio-demographic and job 
characteristics.  
The results of the base treatment where employers could not screen employees and where 
the control strategy prevailed are consistent with both the self-interest model and models of 
social preferences. Pure self-interest alone, however, cannot explain the results of the screening 
and competition treatment. We identify a significant minority of employees who are prepared to 
reciprocate high wages with high effort. Since employees can build a reputation, this is sufficient 
to induce strategic employees to mimic the reciprocal employees, which in turn renders the trust 
strategy of paying high wages and leaving discretion to employees profitable. This is consistent 
with models of social preferences. The data are also consistent with the existence of hidden costs 
of control, but these costs turn out to be small in our experiment.  
Our experiments not only offer an explanation for the viability of “high-performance 
work systems” that grant much effort discretion to the employees, but also suggest why these 
innovative human resource management practices are not universally adopted. First of all, our 
findings point towards the importance of inexpensive screening opportunities. If screening 
employees is impossible or very costly, the trust strategy is likely to fail. Second, there must be a 
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productivity advantage for giving discretion to employees. If discretion does not affect the 
employee's productivity, the control strategy is more likely to be optimal. Finally, and perhaps 
most surprisingly, labor market competition strongly favors the trust strategy. Competition 
induces employers to condition their job offers more strongly on the employees’ track record 
which causes large increases in employees’ incentives for reputation formation. As a 
consequence, employees provide much higher effort levels which, together with the stronger 
screening activities, cause a large increase in the prevalence of the trust strategy. 
Our results and our experimental design give rise to many new, interesting questions. For 
example, an employer in our setting can design the job after observing the employee's reputation. 
In reality, however, the employer often has to commit to a job design when he decides in which 
kind of production technology to invest, i.e. before he gets to know his employees. If the 
employer believes that employees cannot be trusted, he may choose a high-monitoring and 
control technology, involving only limited task discretion and depriving him of the potential 
productivity gains from high effort discretion. Under these circumstances, the employers’ 
incentives to elicit high effort via efficiency wages are diluted and, in the presence of low wages, 
employees will provide low effort levels. Thus, the employers’ initial pessimistic expectations 
regarding effort will be confirmed, providing little reason to change the overall job design. A 
widespread implementation of innovative human resource practices may therefore be 
considerably more difficult to achieve in the presence of an ex-ante commitment for a particular 
technology – a conjecture that could be tested by varying our experimental design.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to know how the existence of explicit screening 
costs affects the prevalence of good jobs. If the employers’ have to pay for information regarding 
an employee’s track record, their willingness to pay depends on their beliefs about the 
distribution of employee types. If all employees are believed to have a bad track record, 
investing in screening is not profitable, inducing the employer to offer bad jobs. However, 
employees will not work hard when offered bad jobs, confirming the initial belief that they have 
a bad track record. Thus, the existence of explicit screening costs could lead to yet another 
vicious circle that would render the widespread implementation of innovative human resource 
management practices difficult – although these practices offer, in principle, the prospect of a 
Pareto-improvement.  
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Finally, a fundamental question in human resource management research is how to 
transform a firm with a long-established corporate culture of control into a high-performance 
workplace. This question cannot be addressed in our current experimental design because new, 
“greenfield” firms are established in each period. An experimental design that permits for the 
endogenous emergence of “brownfield” establishments before new forms of work practices can 
be adopted would permit studying the sources of transition costs and the optimal implementation 
of organizational change. Thus, there is no shortage of fascinating questions for future research 
that could be tackled with the use of suitable variations of our experimental design. 
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[Appendix: Behavioral Types among the Employees 
In Result 5b, we claim that there were narrowly self-interested types among the employees who 
did not reciprocate generous wages with high effort levels. We will document the different types 
of the employees in this appendix. Note that we only use the data of the second treatment within 
a session for this appendix, as we need individual observations from both the base and the 
screening treatments in order to characterize the prevailing types. To determine the different 
employee types, we compute the following reciprocity index for each employee in the base and 
in the screening treatments.  
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The actual effort in period t is denoted by tie , the minimum effort employee i  could 
choose in period t  is denoted by 0
te  (which is 1 if a trust contract was offered and 3 if a control 
contract was offered), and *te  denotes the fair effort for employee i in period t. The fair effort is 
the effort level that equalizes the employee's and employer's payoffs given the contract the 
employer offers, i.e., b⋅ *te – w = w – *te , rounded to the next integer (since only integer values 
were allowed as effort choices). We only consider cases where the wage was high enough so that 
*te  exceeded 0
te ; iN  denotes the number of such periods for employee i  (we have at least one 
such period for each employee in each treatment). Thus, an employee who always chooses the 
fair effort level *te  has a reciprocity index of 1, while an employee who always chooses the 
minimum effort has a reciprocity index of 0. We have a reciprocity index for each employee in 
both the base and in the screening treatments.  
The left panel of Figure A1 plots the reciprocity indices for each employee in the base 
and the screening treatments against each other. We round these indices to natural numbers in the 
right panel. Three large clusters of employees arise on the basis of the reciprocity index:36 
 
                                                 
36 Note that there is only one employee with an index of one in the base treatment and of zero in the screening 
treatment, i.e. we only have a single agent that acts reciprocally in the base but selfishly in the screening treatment. 
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FIGURE A1.—Classification of employees’ types. In the left panel, each dot represents one 
employee. In the right panel, we round the reciprocity indices to natural numbers illustrating our 
classification of employees’ types. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of 
employees in each category. 
 
Narrowly self-interested types: About 20 percent of the employees (23 out of 108) have a 
reciprocity index close to zero in both the screening and the base treatments. These employees do 
not reciprocate high wages with high effort in either treatment, even though this would be 
profitable in the screening treatment.37 Their average payoff in the base treatment is 7.37, a little 
above the overall average of 6.95. In the screening treatment, however, these employees are 
stuck with a low reputation because they are offered few jobs with full discretion (only in 25 
percent of the cases); as a consequence, their average income is only 7.35, considerably less than 
the overall average income of 9.51. 
Reciprocal types: About 30 percent of the employees (31 out of 108) have a reciprocity 
index close to one (or larger) in both treatments. These employees always reciprocate high wages 
with high effort. They choose an average effort of 4.71 in the base treatment and earn an average 
payoff of only 6.70. This is a little less than the overall average, but these employees voluntarily 
choose to sacrifice some of their own payoff in order to reciprocate high wage offers. They 
spend an average effort of 5.96 in the screening treatment and acquire a medium or high 
reputation. They are therefore offered more job offers with full discretion (in 46 percent of the 
cases) and attain an average income of 9.33. 
                                                 
37 They choose an average effort of 2.78 in the base treatment and of 3.35 in the screening treatment. 
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Strategic types: About 50 percent of the employees (53 out of 108) have a reciprocity 
index close to zero in the base treatment and close to one (or larger) in the screening treatment. 
These employees act strategically and reciprocate if their performance record is observed, but do 
not reciprocate if future employers are unable to detect low effort. They look like the narrowly 
self-interested types in the base treatment: They choose an average effort of 3.08, and their 
average income is 6.85. In the screening treatment, however, they closely approximate the 
reciprocal types. They choose an average effort of 5.97, acquire a medium or high reputation and 
are offered jobs with full discretion in the majority of the cases (52 percent). As a result, they 
receive a high average income (10.60).  
